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Surprise  
A Circular Dynamic of Multi-Directional Verbalization   
Natalie Depraz 
Université de Rouen 
The wide open mouth reveals the shock of the heart. 
- Charles Le Brun, The Expression of the Passions (1667) 
 
And all of a sudden the memory came back to me. The taste was that of the 
small piece of madeleine ...  
- Marcel Proust, Swann’s Way (1913) vol. I, 48. 
 
Introduction 
"I needed a bit of time to find something to say, just to explain my reaction 
to this tableau.  At first, I was so confused, surprised, that I did not know what 
to say. Then I regatherhed myself; it takes away the words from one’s mouth, 
I do not know how to speak about; I do not know what it is, I did not know what 
happened especially. It seems to belong to the domain of the inexpressible, 
the indescribable, and that has been pretty hard, not only to identify and think 
about it, but first of all to confront, to observe and to cope with it...” (T: n ° 6, 
l. 71-79).1  
"Me, I told myself that it is very beautiful, is a very b '...  in the end, it is 
beautiful in its style, the colors are pretty, it is really, it is arranged, there is an 
idea behind it... Then after I looked at it in relation to the rest of the body, I 
said to myself, this is not possible, I did not say it, but I told myself, that's not 
possible... "(A: n ° 11, l. 35-36 and l. 156-157) 
“I asked myself "oh my, what is it?" floating... frustration, also... not 
knowing what it could represent... umm... I only know that I said to myself:  
‘oh my, it is really frustrating, its really unbelievable that one does not know 
what the painting represents’" (T: n ° 6, l. 134-149)  
“Just for a second, it was just ‘wow!’” (S: n ° 8, l. 65-66)  
"It is... well, the eyes, the eyes widened, physically" (A: No. 11, l. 71-72) 
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As opening remarks, these examples of students’ expression of surprise 
during a visual task that I will detail later provide a good indication of the 
very broad and heterogeneous scope of the manifestations of surprise, 
whether they are verbal or not: silence, internal speech, the language of the 
body, organic language (like interjections and exclamations), rationalizations 
after the fact that explicitly use the noun or verb forms of “surprise”, along 
with many other emotional nouns or adjectives ("horrible!"), and even 
cognitive processes ("confused"), after the moment of surprise has already 
happened and is identified afterwards. 
One of the questions that may be asked, based on these different 
occurrences, is whether there is truly a “language” of surprise, that is to say, 
an expression to manifest it adequately at the very time when it happens, or 
if it has the characteristic precisely of escaping from language. Whether I am 
so surprised that I have my mouth wide open or am overcome by trembling, 
jumping, shaking, my heart racing, but unable to verbalize anything 
whatsoever, or whether I bear witness afterwards to my surprise by 
expressing that, actually, "I was surprised", that “it surprised me”, or 
“imagine my surprise!”2 In short, at the moment of surprise, it is as if there 
were a linguistic blank, a silence or a bodily presence, and that language then 
comes along to articulate after something has already taken place. In what 
follows, I want to re-examine this hypothesis that is based on the dichotomy 
between the non-verbal (silence, body) and the verbal (articulated speech), 
and to propose an integrative alternative that holds language and experience 
together within one and the same dynamic. 
*** 
I have chosen to speak about the "languages of surprise", with the aim of 
proposing a perspective located at a distance from the distinction, a little too 
simplistic in my opinion, between, on the one side, the a priori idea that there 
is a single or a unified language of surprise, whose eidos can be extracted, 
namely, its language or linguistic essence, and on the other side, the empirical, 
comparative investigation of a socio-linguistic kind that would be dedicated 
to the various expressions of surprise in different languages. These two types 
of investigations, theoretical and empirical, are of course rich in lessons for us. 
But, as for myself, I would like to contribute something less analytical or local 
than integrative (that is to say including equally the experiential and conceptual 
dimensions in a co-generative mode), and to bring out what I will call in fine 
the "dynamics of the multi-directional verbalization" of surprise.  
To do this, I will need a different conceptual division from the usual 
dichotomy between what is linguistic, that which derives from language, and 
what would be "extralinguistic", that which would derive from internal states, 
lived experience, social phenomena or social constructs. I would like to 
consider the entire palette of the expressiveness of surprise, which in my 
opinion is what makes surprise. In fact, surprise is first of all bodily, based on 
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a distinction that I have established elsewhere between the language of the 
body and the corporeality of language.3 The language of the body, as is 
known, is made up of facial expressions, gestures, a sudden burst of 
physiological responses, the speed of the heartbeat, the rate of respiration, the 
sweating of the skin. In contrast, the corporeality of language is expressed by 
interjections, exclamations, questions, a slowing down of the speed, a 
suspenseful tone, and even stammering or gibberish. But, surprise also plays 
a role in latency, a silence tied to internal discourse. And thirdly, it will be 
discursive and thereby constructed by multiple discursive forms (descriptive, 
narrative, argumentative); it will be drawn from a rhetoric or a stylistics. It is 
in order to be able to render the full range of this expressive palette that I have 
chosen here to speak of the languages of surprise without any restrictions. 
After further consideration, in order to realize the multiple modalities of 
surprise, I have opted to use two terms: expressiveness and verbalization. The 
term “expressiveness” is used here rather than simply expression, to avoid 
going back to what I consider to be the unilateral idea of “markers” [external] 
of a surprise that would be understood as a lived experience or a state 
[internal] expressing itself afterwards in these markers and in its external 
organs, which are usually modal forms (here: anticipatory, "I cannot tell you"), 
interjections or exclamatory intensifiers (here it is relational: “Oh really? 
Truly?”). As the playwright Racine once noted in the preface to his play 
“Bérénice”: "my piece is ready, all I have to do is to write it!” Or like the 
grammarian Dumarsais who in his eighteenth- century entry on "Wonder" in 
the Encyclopedia, saw in the qualification of a tone, a gesture or a point wonder 
(which is a synonym of exclamation) as the "mark" of surprise, as if it were an 
internal state experienced autonomously, that afterwards receives, in an 
extrinsic way, external marks. And the term “verbalization” is used here 
rather than language in order to account for the procedural dimension 
involved in surprise, which obliterates the very abstract idea of a dichotomous 
"passage" from the internal to the external. The notions of expressiveness and 
verbalization thus allow me to justify a contrario a "linguistic phenomenology" 
to which the linguist Emile Benvéniste and the phenomenologist Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, each in their own way, laid claim in their time in terms of the 
mutually generative constraints that lived experience and verbalizing 
expressivity exert on each other. I am gladly entering into their wake here. 
*** 
To give an idea of the span of the dynamics of verbalization of surprise 
that I will try to bring to light, I will start with the philosophical theoretical 
place that is, in my opinion, the most remarkable in terms of the descriptive 
phenomenology of surprise, 4 namely, its approach by Paul Ricœur in Freedom 
and Nature in terms of what he calls “emotion-surprise.”5 This theoretical 
position will lead me to retrace, in a second step, the archeology of what 
Ricoeur calls the “circular phenomenon” or the “circular process” of surprise. 
I will follow each of these two paths successively, that of body language in a 
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burst of "shaking", and that of the language of cognitive as well as aesthetic 
"shock". There is an a priori antinomy here that is based on a post-Cartesian 
duality of the body and the mind, but it is circularized by Ricoeur. On the 
basis of this dual model of surprise, I will retrace its genealogy in a number 
of authors (Darwin, James, Izard, and Ekman on the one hand, and Peirce, 
Husserl, Dennett, Davidson, on the other hand) and will analyze some first-
person descriptions that come from “microphenomenological interviews” 
[entretiens d’explicitation].6 Why do that? It is a matter, in so doing, of sketching 
out an experiential phenomenology of the dynamics of the verbalization of 
surprise, which alone, in my opinion, allows it to be shown in its procedural 
micro-complexity, that is, in its non-linear circularity. I will try to show in situ 
that it takes the concrete form of generative launches [relances] of lived 
experience through different linguistic components in the broadest sense and 
back from them through lived experience.  
Bodily Shaking and Internal Stupor: The Flow of Bodily 
Surprise into Thought in a State of Shock 
A "shock of knowledge along the pathway leading back from the shaking 
of the body"?7 A "bodily stupor" along the path leading back from a thought 
which is spread out by incarnation?8 These two complex expressions are 
found in the chapter on surprise in Freedom and Nature. In my opinion, they 
masterfully account for the specific rhythm of the “reflux” of surprise, where 
the immediacy of a shock, a crisis, and the duration of a journey which is here 
called its “spread” are found to be articulated in a unique manner. Surprised, 
the body shakes and flows back onto thought simultaneously in the moment 
of shock. Thought, in turn, stupefies the body, which, on its side, weighs 
down fleeting thought with the more spread out duration of incarnation.  
Ricoeur, building in an exemplary manner on the Cartesian conception 
of wonder as a "sudden surprise of the soul", in §70 of the Treatise on the 
Passions, makes surprise the "most rudimentary function of emotion", the 
"most simple emotive attitude.”9 In doing so, Ricoeur states that he owes “the 
principle of [his] description” to Descartes’s six principle passions and that 
they serve as his "guiding thread." Why? Ricoeur builds his description of 
surprise by pitting Descartes against "modern psychology which [he says] 
derives emotion from a shock and describes it as a crisis.”10 By contrast, 
according to Ricoeur, Descartes “derives [emotion] from surprise."11 They 
both therefore grant a primary role to surprise as a source of the emotions and 
as irreducible to its bodily indication in a burst of shock. Prior to that, Ricoeur 
gives “emotion-surprise” a central role in the “fertile disordering” of human 
life, on the basis on which both “emotion-shock” and “emotion-passion” can 
be understood. They correspond, in turn, to aberrant or pathological 
disorders. So the conceptual construct that Ricoeur proposes is very original: 
it unfolds in three steps that are unified by an understanding of emotion as a 
“fertile disordering.” Surprise plays the role of an emotional source, whereas 
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shock and passion refer to radicalizations of disorder, whether it is 
instantaneous and corporeal in the case of shock or inscribed in duration and 
in the mind as in the case of passion.  
Surprise thus forms an undivided source of the emotions, prior to the 
bifurcation between the body and the mind. In this respect, one can say that 
Ricœur ultimately leads the Cartesian dualistic problem in the direction of an 
experiential dynamic of the body-mind that belongs to the phenomenology of 
the lived and living body, whether it is the Husserlian Leib or the Merleau-
Pontian “bodily consciousness”. That is why he is able to say that surprise, 
with its status as a single source, “already contains all the richness of what has 
been called the circular phenomenon of thought and the body.”12  
Ultimately, this model of a phenomenological circulation is what interests 
me in the description offered by the author of Freedom and Nature. It describes 
a dynamic of the experience of surprise that holds together, without any 
explanatory or experiential priority, both the lived internal process and 
expressive visibility (which is bodily here, but which can also be linguistic in 
the broad sense of expressiveness as well as the strict linguistic sense). One 
can thereby understand why Ricoeur, though he himself does not speak 
explicitly about the “language” of surprise, requires us to do so in an 
exemplary manner. He offers an integrative circular model for the 
phenomenon of surprise in which these two sides, the lived and the 
expressive, are joined together like the south-facing and the north-facing 
slopes of the same mountain, like the front and back of the same coin, or like 
the front and the back side of a single sheet of paper, with, moreover, the 
explanation of their dynamic passage from the one to the other like the 
Möbius image of a co-emergence or a folding together. Indeed, the 
phenomenality of surprise holds together this reciprocal reversal between the 
lived and expressive sides, and this occurs in a rhythm that connects the 
sudden and the enduring. Ricoeur states: "in surprise, a living being is 
overcome by a new event which it undergoes, by the other ; […] through it, 
time gets its coloration, [...] something happens [...]. The sudden and the new 
might not be real: absence or fiction can meet us, touch us, astonish us in the 
same way."13 Thus surprise finds its phenomenal acuity at the junction with 
what gives rise to it, whether it is an external perceptual event or an internal 
reverberation of my thoughts, images or memories. This manifests, in turn, 
the junction between the instant and duration, according to a chiasm whose 
own temporal rhythm borrows its phases of immediacy and of unfolding 
from lived experience or expressiveness and then launches them through one 
another. Whence this formulation that is dense but so elegant, with which I 
began and which I will repeat again: "[surprise] is at the same time and all at 
once a shock of knowledge and a shaking of the body, or better, a shock of 
knowledge in a shaking of the body.” This circular coinciding of lived 
experience and expression corresponds to the movement of the unfolding of 
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surprise, according to the two simultaneous processes of - in Ricoeur’s terms 
– shock (lived experience) and shaking (bodily expression). 
It is striking, in this regard, that Ricœur repeatedly employs the adjective 
"circular" three times on a single page: surprise is a “circular phenomenon”, 
has a “circular character”, and is a "circular process”. And he describes more 
dynamically what was initially noted in the static mode of co-inciding: "[the 
emotion of surprise] is nourished by bodily repercussions; the shock of 
knowledge is on the return path leading from shaking and bodily stupor to 
thought."14 Note here that the attribute of shock, with the instantaneousness 
that Ricoeur initially imputes in a critical manner to the bodily reflexes, is now 
the past for thought, for knowledge, and that the body is a contrario assigned 
the procedural attributes that are inscribed in duration: repercussions, 
shaking, stupor, path, flow. It is as if only the body, which is no longer 
reducible to a reflex and which has become a basic feeling, could provide a 
durable and tangible gauge for a thought that is unable to weigh itself down 
in incarnation, always linked to an incoherence, to the flight of ideas, always 
evanescent. At bottom, it is lived experience that turns a reflex into a feeling, 
and the body that weighs thought down into tangibility. That is why I cannot 
resist reading Ricoeur’s description a little bit further, which reveals, like his 
mode of writing, a finesse that utilizes both lived experience and expression 
to account for surprise:  
How can a quick judgment about novelty mean for the 
body a quickened pulse, a diffuse inhibition, a certain 
stupor which stiffens the face and allows the mobile parts 
of the senses to be received? And in return, why is this 
disposition of the body also a disposition of the mind to 
consider the object and to linger on it [...]? Thus incarnate 
thought is no longer point-like nor reduced to gliding 
endlessly over things without stopping on any of them. The 
body prevents the encounter with the new from remaining 
only a furtive touch. It makes consciousness spread out and 
in some sense crash into a representation [...]. The body 
amplifies and magnifies the instant of thought by giving the 
time of bodily shock the thickness of duration. Through 
surprise, a thought becomes imposed, in a sense, 
physically.15  
Even though Ricoeur distances himself from the psychology of reflexes 
due to its inability to account for surprise in its full complexity, the Cartesian 
basis of his psychology, which he called a principle of his description, 
eventually leads him to grant the body an irreplaceable ability to embody 
cognitive shock in the form of a tangible shaking. From that point, it is not 
much further to turn shock [saisissement] itself, which was initially reserved to 
the active cognition of a “grasping” [saisi] (of the con-ceptual), into a bodily 
movement. 
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So if thought becomes imposed physically with surprise, it will be based 
– as I will do in what follows - on exploring its multimodal expressiveness as 
a mode of verbal physical imposition on to a thought that is deeply rooted in 
the body. 
The Dynamic Antinomy of the Expression of Surprise: The 
Co-emergence of “Shaking” and “Shock” 
It is clear that the various forms of expressiveness – which are indicated 
by the declension of surprise on a sliding scale that ranges from the corporeal 
to the cognitive-aesthetic - do not boil down to the same thing. While Ricoeur 
initially assigns shaking to the bodily expression of surprise and shock to its 
cognitive mode of expression, we have also seen that the body can be shocked 
or stunned and that thought can be shaken, vacillate, and vibrate. Each mode 
passes into the other.  Therefore, in this second stage, it will be a matter of 
finding expressive forms of surprise that come more from organic 
corporeality and those that derive more from cognitive or even aesthetic 
processes, showing in each case their multiple differentiated qualities.  
The "Body Language" of Surprise 
It is banal to note that not every expression is necessarily verbal, but in 
the case of surprise, this observation is especially fecund. It allows us to access 
bodily expressiveness which, whether it is facial or gestural, can respond in 
silence but can also be associated with more or less articulated verbal 
manifestations. Accordingly, I have distinguished between three forms of 
bodily expression of surprise, which refer to: a language of the body, a 
corporeality of language in the form of a barely articulated verbalization, and 
a silence whose own eloquence refers to a latent space of internal discourse. 
The psychobiological tradition has frequently identified the first form of 
bodily expressiveness. With an emphasis on facial expressions and on linking 
surprise to a number of physiognomic features, its aim is to reveal an 
invariant, physiognomic eidos (universal) of the primary emotions. Charles 
Darwin, in chapter XII of The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals 
(1872), provides access specifically to surprise. On the basis of a comparative 
empirical investigation of photos and direct observations, he identifies 
surprise with several facial features, including the raising of the eyebrows, the 
opening of the mouth and eyes. He goes on to develop an exciting micro-
phenomenology of the interaction between the expressive organs and internal 
emotions. 
In the direct lineage of Darwin’s initial hypotheses, the psychologist Paul 
Ekman conducted a comparative anthropological study of the people of New 
Guinea in an effort to support the thesis that there are seven universal basic 
emotions (anger, fear, joy, sorrow, disgust, surprise, and hate), and in so 
doing, he created the famous Facial Action Coding System. Surprise, in this 
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framework, is identified as a constant that is based on a combination of several 
facial muscles. Ekman, however, was led to relativize the supposed 
physiognomic universality of facial micro-expressions, since in some cultural 
contexts he found that the facial expressions corresponding to fear and 
surprise were confused by indigenous observers, as if an expressive criteria 
of a physiognomic kind alone would not allow surprise to be identified 
unequivocally.16 The Darwinian approach to the expression of emotions still 
remains too classical, since the traits of the surprised face are presented as the 
manifestation of an internal state awakened by an object. These facial features 
are vehicles for surprise, just as linguistic markers are the external 
manifestation of surprise as a lived experience.  
The psychologist William James, writing after Darwin but before Ekman, 
will already strongly challenge this standard view. For him, in a somewhat 
provocative way, the physiognomic expression is surprise itself, surprise 
being directly the corporeal change in question. Even if James does not talk 
about surprise as such but about the emotions in general and fear in 
particular, we can repeat his radical thesis. He rejects “the supposed 
‘expression of emotion’”17 about which Darwin speaks in an interactive but 
still dualistic way and believes that the corporeal expression of emotion is the 
emotion itself.18 That is how James is able to claim with regard to emotion: 
“Without the bodily states following on the perception, the latter would be 
purely cognitive in form, pale, colorless, destitute of emotional warmth.”19 Or 
even more specifically with respect to fear: “what kind of an emotion of fear 
would be life, if the feelings neither of quickened heartbeats nor shallow 
breathing, neither of trembling lips nor of weakened limbs, neither of goose-
flesh nor of visceral stirrings, were present?”20 Now the unqualified 
identification of surprise with an emotion presents a problem, and a number 
of philosophers, phenomenologists as well as philosophers of the mind, 
define surprise as irreducible to an emotional valence, as a rupture, a gap, a 
more or less radical opening at the heart of a cognitive process.21 This leads 
me to restrict James’s thesis and refuse to turn the language of the body into 
the exclusive language of surprise, or even to make corporeal expression an a 
priori of surprise. Even if this physiognomic language is very common and 
helps to characterize surprise, I will propose the hypothesis that surprise can 
exist without the language of the body.  
For example, in a quite original way, the psychologist Carroll Izard finds 
that the expression of surprise is not only corporeal (physiognomic) but can 
also be non-bodily.22 It can pass as well or exclusively through a language that 
has its own corporeality, but meets a level of expressiveness that is not, 
however, articulated verbally. What is that? For Izard, the major expression 
of surprise is the cry, and more broadly, the forms of vocalization that have 
no meaning as such but have a relational communicative purpose, in short, 
those that provide intersubjective sharing. Linguists who are interested in the 
corporeality of the language of surprise in its various forms have recently 
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acknowledged the central role of interjections, exclamations, and even 
questions.23 Later I will examine a few interviews in order to point out the 
importance of periods of silence, the slowing of the flow, of stammering and 
babbling. 
*** 
In seeking to capture the two sides of the "bodily language" of surprise, 
one strives to identify the instantaneous segment of surprise, its mode of 
appearing in action, at the time, as if its sudden and spontaneous character 
were crystallized flawlessly and transparently in these instantaneous 
physiognomic and vocalizing expressions. But I will now raise the question: 
Is there not a persistent illusion here, which leads us to seek to capture the 
moment, the immediacy of experience, while it is known that one can only 
ever gather its effect, its afterthought, its echo, no matter how fast it is? This 
is a myth of spontaneity and immediacy that phenomenology has also 
sometimes maintained, and it would be detrimental to an investigation of 
surprise to reduce it in an illusory – abstract - way only to the search for its 
most instantaneous expressions. These expressions, moreover, are already 
effects, no matter how fast and spontaneous they are, and this is why I will 
defend the idea here that surprise is expressed as much in its most condensed 
and instantaneous expressive forms as in its most spread out discursive 
modes. 
The Linguistic-Awareness of Surprise 
My hypothesis is that even an instant takes time, whether it is bodily or 
internal.  Surprise is a process, even if it is only a micro-process, and that is 
why it is instructive to examine the more articulated discursive forms – which 
are more unfolded – that express the dynamics of its unfolding. In fact, does 
not body language possess the privilege of the illusion of the instantaneous? 
Does not Ricoeur himself speak about the “shock” of knowing? Does not the 
phrase "becoming aware", in turn, tend to indicate something sudden, a snap 
action? Even the stylistics and rhetoric of surprise assigns it a verbal segment 
of the "stroke” [coup], something that happens so quickly that we do not see it 
at the time, and that we cannot account for "afterwards." In the Poetics, 
Aristotle identifies surprise with the eplektikon, with the “plêge”, the stroke. 
Proust, in the Search, freely repeats the expression “all of a sudden” more than 
300 times, which could be seen as a “marker” of shock, the quintessential 
marker of surprise.24 
The illusion is tenacious: the a priori of surprise is not the instantaneous, 
the spontaneous.25 My hypothesis goes in the opposite direction from this 
type of evidence and takes the counter-intuitive form of duration. In this 
respect, Ricoeur’s position is extremely valuable because he also rejects the 
“punctum” of surprise. Our allies here, to begin, are those who believe in so-
called cognitive or epistemic surprise. This view is held by authors who are 
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as different in their philosophical positions as the founder of pragmatism C. 
S. Peirce, the founder of phenomenology Edmund Husserl, and philosophers 
of the mind like Daniel Dennett or Donald Davidson. They all agree in seeing 
surprise as a process that is articulated in phases. The impression of shock is 
always missed, never lived through, and is unidentifiable on its own. It is only 
given after a state of expectation, a belief that makes it experientially possible. 
Correlatively, following its reverberation as an echo, there is persistence in 
what I receive from it. 
Whence the interest, too, of studying the dynamics of reversal in play in 
dramaturgical and narrative forms that place surprise and its inscription in 
situations and interpersonal contexts, connecting it, for example, with the 
logic of learning in coming of age novels [romans de formation] in which there 
is a full heuristics of knowledge or even of recognition. I would like to 
mention, as one indication, the motto "Oh, what a surprise" that runs 
throughout Goethe’s coming of age novel Elective Affinities. This novel is 
based on the dramatization of romantic encounters, each time developing the 
intrigue of a prospective affinity and its explicit un-known. This gives rise to 
repeated exclamatory interrogations by the characters in which the noun or 
the verb of surprise is used excessively and associated with different emotions 
(joy, pleasure, embarrassment, tearing apart, etc.). This is a fine example of 
the narrative-theatrical dynamics of surprise that are articulated in language 
and bear witness to the unprecedented opening of a meaning that is already 
implicitly anticipated by the characters. I will cite here just one example of 
this recurrence, among many others:  
Edward did not know what to answer. He looked at her, he looked at the 
transcript. The first few sheets were written with the greatest carefulness in a 
delicate woman’s hand - then the strokes appeared to alter, to become more 
light and free - but who can describe his surprise, as he ran his eyes over the 
concluding page? “For heaven’s sake,” he cried, “what is this? this is my 
hand!26  
Through the narrative setting that creates the reader’s expectation and 
then the exclamations and questions which reveal the new situation, Edward 
shows that his becoming conscious is durable with a lasting deep affinity that 
was in fact already implicitly anticipated, which connects him to Ottilie, and 
also to the disturbing resemblance of the handwriting. 
Allow me also, in a complementary fashion, to cite the conclusion of an 
article by Nathalie Mauriac-Dyer which is devoted to the poetics of surprise 
in Aristotle and Proust, in which the author insists on the fact that “Proustian 
surprise is not only an epistemic figure but also an aesthetic figure.” This point 
also helps to support my (and Ricoeur’s) intuition: “the greatest works are 
[…] the ones which know how to maintain a character of ‘durable novelty’,” 
writes Proust. In other words, they are the ones in which the brief and sharp 
time of surprise, a time of the unfamiliar, of the loss of landmarks, of the 
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reformulation of the terms of the world, is extended, distended, and held on 
to. This is about precisely no longer recognizing oneself there, making 
surprise endure. This surprise that does not end is certainly the type of surprise 
that is the object of the highest poetry.”27  
The Multi-Directional Circular Dynamics of the 
Verbalization of Surprise 
It is this specific quality of the duration of surprise that exists in multiple 
expressive phases here which I would now like to account for the basis of 
some experiential descriptions in the first person, taken from interviews. 
What does this experiential component add to my hypothesis? Two elements: 
first, it will allow me to confirm the intuition already theoretically recognized 
by Aristotle, Ricoeur, phenomenologists and philosophers of mind, as well as 
novelists like Goethe or Proust, concerning the cognitive-aesthetic duration of 
the verbal or non-verbal expressiveness of surprise. Second, beyond the 
confirmation of this point, I will show in situ that this micro-duration has its 
own quality that cannot be reduced to the succession of articulated phases, 
instead it gives rise to a non-linear process of verbalization, where sometimes 
an initial silence is actually laden with internal speech, where the initial 
exclamation or interjection is replayed a few seconds later in light of an 
internal awareness that produces a cascading surprise, where an association 
of memories or a moral judgment produces a new, highly emotional facet of 
the initial surprise. In short, the non-linearity of the verbalization of surprise 
is multi-modal and unfolds according to the encroachments, overlappings, 
and powerful comebacks that require an entrance into the heterogeneous and 
aleatory matter of this duration. 
This is something that I want you to anticipate in my presentation of a 
few elements of this dynamic of verbalization, without claiming at this time 
to be exhaustive, to the extent that the interviews are still in process, have not 
all been transcribed, nor analyzed a fortiori. 
*** 
This first-person experiential work is displayed in connection with a 
linguistic task for which Pascale Goutéraux is responsible as a partner on 
Team 2 of the ANR Emphiline.28 The assignment given to students is to revisit 
one of the painted-images presented among a series of twelve, according to 
the following criterion: "choose an image that especially marked or struck 
you.” The interview consists of placing the student in a stance of embodied 
evocation by placing the student back at the moment in which the image 
appeared, leading the student to express his or her feelings at the very 
moment and to relaunch his or her expressions by open questions of the type 
“How?” rather than “What?” or “Why?” This helps to avoid any induction of 
the content or explanatory causality and to keep it as close as possible to 
expressive lived experiences. The lived expressive micro-sequences are 
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centered on the time of the image’s emergence and unfold spontaneously on 
its immediate persistence and the expectations that preceded the image’s 
appearance. We thus have for each student a micro-description in mini-
phases of a few seconds each, which is not, of course, a prejudice against the 
quality of duration but a way to register this micro-temporality. 
I chose three of the interviews that I transcribed and analyzed.29 Each of 
them involves the same image, a contemporary painting by Reyberolles 
Implosion (1994), which was frequently chosen by the students. This provides 
an objective unity to begin with and allows us to observe some constants as 
well as some variables between them. For each of these interviews, I have 
adopted a multi-vector analysis methodology that identifies nine structural 
criteria (time, language, body, emotion, cognition, mixed dimensions, 
morality, the objective properties of the image, and the overall feeling), 
placing each of them on a horizontal dynamic line in order to be able to 
observe their transversal-vertical dimensions.30  
By way of analysis, the three interviews yield a dynamics of language 
that includes the following four components: 1) a period of silence pointing 
to a rich internal discourse that is very effervescent; 2) a body language that 
can be expressed on the two sides identified previously: the language of the 
body and the corporeality of language; 3) an expression-description that weds 
the spatial duration of the visual course to different maps and aspects of the 
painting, whether local or global; 4) an expression-rationalization that has the 
form of argued judgments or moral prescriptions. These four components are 
not necessarily all present in all the interviews, nor in the same way; 
sometimes they are only minor, and anyway, do not necessarily appear 
according to the same schema of successive temporal phases. Yet, they do 
seem to correspond to possible structural components of the dynamics of the 
verbalization of surprise. 
Two students attest to a period of initial silence (T and S). Specifically, 
they did not speak immediately upon seeing the image. They bear witness to 
it in their own respective ways, in a pithy way ("I said nothing... at the 
moment", S - n ° 8, l. 26), or a more elaborate way ("I needed a bit of time to 
find something to say, just to explain my reaction to this tableau. At first, one 
is so confused, surprised, that one does not know what to say. We recover 
ourselves, it takes the words from our mouth. One does not know how to talk 
about it is not known what it is, one does not know what happened, pi especially, 
it seems to participate in the domain of the inexpressible, in the indescribable, 
and it has been pretty hard, not only to identify it and think about it, but first 
of all to confront it and respond to it ...”, (T n ° 6, l. 71-79). In this second case, 
the silence is in response to an important cognitive effervescence, linked to 
the difficulty of identification, which refers to an internal speech of an 
apophatic nature.  
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This first observation allows us to differentiate several scenarios 
concerning the first temporal phase of emergence: either the expressive 
reaction occurs immediately (that is what some other students say) and, in 
this case, it can be verbal or physio-logical (I'll get to this point in a moment), 
or it occurs after a period of silence, and this silence can either be experienced 
without internal discourse or can refer to a discursive internal lived 
experience. What, then, does one mean by "spontaneous reactions”? In view 
of the different existing cases, one is led to sort through the so-called 
"spontaneous" lived experience according to various figures: bodily, verbal or 
internal discourse. As a result, the verbal/non-verbal distinction turns out to 
be too abstract with regard to the different modes of givenness of spontaneous 
lived experiences: Is internal discursive spontaneity non-verbal? It is at 
minimum “pregnant” with explicit verbalizations, and at maximum, it can be 
said to be full with meaning after this internal moment. And in any case, we 
should renounce the overly simplistic linear schema that would see in the 
process of verbalization a schema in which there would be a succession from 
non-verbal or pre-verbal silence to the verbal reaction. 
And this is all the more the case since the silence tied to an internal 
discourse is not only initial, in connection with the shock of the appearance of 
the image. The period of silence also comes back later and can be interwoven 
with subsequent types of verbalization. Two of the students (A and T) bear 
witness to this: "Me, I told myself that it is very beautiful, is a very b '...  in the 
end, it is beautiful in its style, the colors are pretty, it is really, it is arranged, 
there is an idea behind it...". Then after I looked at it in relation to the rest of 
the body, I said to myself, this is not possible, I did not say it, but I told myself, 
that's not possible... "(A: n ° 11, l. 35-36 and l. 156-157). And, “I asked myself 
‘oh my, what is it?’ floating... frustration, also... not knowing what it could 
represent... umm... I only know that I said to myself: "oh my, it is really 
frustrating, it’s really unbelievable that one does not know what the painting 
represents" (T: n ° 6, l. 134-149). In both cases, these fragments of internal 
discourse are carried by the verbal expression “I told myself,” which also 
implies a period of silence that, at least in the second case, is not initial: “after 
I looked in relation to the rest of the body.” In the interval, there were 
segments of verbal reactions. To confirm that the verbal expression “I told 
myself” is not an improper or colloquial way of expressing what they really 
said at that moment and that it corresponded to an actual verbal reaction,31 I 
then asked the students, in order to remove any ambiguity, to clarify for me 
whether they expressed this reaction verbally or said it to themselves 
internally. Whence the following clarification by T: “I said to myself, it is not 
possible, I did not say it, but I said it to myself, it is not possible . . .” Here it 
is clearly an entire segment of internal discourse, which is swarming with 
recurrent exclamations “it is not possible!”/ “it is really unbelievable!” that 
attest to the student’s resistance to integrate the meaning, the understanding 
of what she sees. And there are also swarms of questions, dramatizations, and 
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lively direct questions in parenthesis: “I told myself: ‘oh my, what is it?’, ‘oh 
my, it is truly frustrating!’” 
Body language, which is the second structural component of the 
dynamics of verbalization, thus occurs on the side of the corporeality of 
language (exclamatory, internal questioning as well as intensive (“truly”), 
concessive (“really”), direct (“oh my!”) exclamations) in a time which is not 
initial. Contrary to the established idea of a successive schema of verbalization 
which would begin with bodily expressions of this kind, and would then be 
articulated in a discourse that makes explicit this inarticulate bodily 
expression. This is how the body-language leitmotif which is expressed in the 
exclamatory interjection "Whoa!” ("I said "whoa!"", T: n ° 6, l. 59-60) occurs for 
T after a period of silence. It is not initial, whereas for S, it seems to happen 
almost immediately: "just for a second, it was just ‘Whoa!’" (S: n ° 8, l. 65-66). 
A has an initially dual mode, which seems to be a synchrony between a facial 
expression: "it is... well, the eyes, the eyes widen, physically" (l. 71-72) and the 
expression of a strong emotional question: "what is that?” Then, I quote: “but 
what is that?" "(And he uses the tone, as if it were there again) (ls. 18-23). Here, 
the present indicative and the familiarity of the question (“that”) attest to a 
strong emotional evocation in the first person. In short, the cognitive process 
tied to internal discourse begins right away, and without an organic or verbal 
bodily reaction. It interweaves interrogative and exclamatory cognitive 
modes, which are tied to hesitation, indecision, resistance to meaning, and the 
inability to understand. This entanglement of the cognitive, bodily expression, and 
internal discourse in its initial appearing seems to me to be the most intriguing 
point in these interviews, at this stage. For it runs counter to the most expected 
doxa which would hold that the body manifests itself first with physiological 
or expressive bodily reactions. With these periods of silence laden with 
intense internal discursivity, we are dealing with a fascinating and effervescent 
subjective duration of the expression of the lived experience of surprise. On that 
basis, we can conclude that the two other components of verbalization - 
expression-description which joins the spatial duration of the visual journey 
with different maps and aspects, local or global, of the painting, and the 
expression-rationalization expression that takes the form of argumentative 
judgments or moral prescriptions - might necessarily be involved in the 
subsequent micro-time of viewing the image. Yet, they themselves have a 
generative character that is linked to the discovery of initially un-seen aspects 
of the painting, or to the memory associations that awaken in the mind and 
can, in turn, generate the return of blazing emotions: "it is twisted!" (A: No. 
11, l.126), or even reactivate organic shocks, for example, by coming to see the 
red spot that was not immediately seen:  "there is this this iiii yuck... this little 
noise which..." (A: n ° 11, l. 127).  
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Conclusion 
These initial elements of the analysis allow me to put forward the idea 
that surprise responds to a circular dynamics of multi-directional 
verbalization, where there is an interweaving, at the very least, of cognition, 
emotion and corporeality, in a non-linear generative schema. Ricoeur’s 
intuitions concerning a circular process and a duration of shock are confirmed 
by these first-person descriptions. Moreover, one can see in them, in a much 
more precise way, the passage through different layers of expressive 
verbalization, as well as their overlapping and distributed co-emergence in 
silent internal discourse as well as in organic and verbal reactions. 
Translated by Scott Davidson 
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